In a Ricardian model with general distributions of industry efficiencies, the welfare gains from trade can be decomposed into a selection and a reallocation effect. The former is the change in average efficiency due to the selection of industries that survive international competition. The latter is the rise in the weight of exporting industries on total production owing to the reallocation of workers from non-exporting industries. Measuring the two effects is difficult in the general case, but the calculations become much simpler when using Fréchet-distributed efficiencies, providing easily quantifiable model-based measures of the two effects. The selection (reallocation) effect appears to be most significant when welfare gains are small (large).
Introduction
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In a very in ‡uential paper, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) have shown that the welfare gains from trade implied by a very large class of models depend on only two su¢ cient statistics: (i) the share of expenditure on domestic goods (which is often called "domestic trade share"); and (ii) the elasticity of imports with respect to variable trade costs ("trade elasticity"). This result is remarkable because it applies to frameworks as di¤erent as the simple Armington model, in which goods are di¤er-entiated by country of origin; the Ricardian model with heterogeneous industries and Fréchet-distributed e¢ ciencies of Eaton and Kortum (2002) ; the monopolistic competition model of Krugman (1980) ; as well as variants of the monopolistic competition model of Melitz (2003) , with heterogeneous …rms and Pareto-distributed e¢ ciencies (such as those developed by Chaney, 2008, and Kramarz, 2011) .
Given their importance for empirical studies, these models are now commonly referred to as "quantitative trade models."
Following this result, the literature appears to be taking two main directions. One analyzes how the measurement of the gains from trade changes when some assumptions of quantitative trade models are relaxed (see Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2015 , and Melitz and Redding, 2014 . The other focuses on the empirical implications of the result. In particular, it is now clear that the various models have di¤erent implications for the estimated value of the trade elasticity, so that even though the analytical formulation of the gains from trade is the same, the resulting quanti…cation still di¤ers across models (Simonovska and Waugh, 2014a) .
In this paper we explore a di¤erent route, by focusing on the sources of the welfare gains of the open economy with respect to the autarky economy. In particular, we study whether quantitative trade models allow us to quantify not only the overall welfare gains, but also the contribution of the di¤erent sources. This is a key issue in both the theoretical and the empirical literature in international trade. The matter is 1 We thank Guglielmo Caporale, Pietro Catte, Giuseppe De Arcangelis, Jonathan Eaton, Alberto Felettigh, Andrea Finicelli, several referees, and seminar participants at Penn State University (PSU) for many useful comments. Part of the paper was written while Stefano Bolatto was visiting the Department of Economics at PSU, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged, and while he was Ph.D. student at the University of Turin. All the remaining errors are ours. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ‡ect those of the Bank of Italy. E-mail: stefano.bolatto@unibo.it, massimo.sbracia@bancaditalia.it. also critical for policy purposes. By understanding what are the most important sources of the welfare gains, countries could design and implement appropriate policies in order to maximize the bene…ts from trade liberalization and foster economic development.
Answering this question, however, is in general very di¢ cult, because di¤erent quantitative models entail di¤erent predictions on the sources of the welfare gains. For example, the gains from consuming a greater variety of goods are key in Armington and monopolistic competition models, but are absent in Ricardian models. Given these sharp di¤erences, we analyze this question for one speci…c family of models and investigate whether belonging to the class of quantitative trade models facilitates the measurement of the contribution of the di¤erent sources.
The family on which we focus is the Ricardian model with many countries and goods, CES preferences, and general distributions of industry e¢ ciencies. Thus, with respect to Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) , although we restrict the attention to only one family of models, we extend the scope of the analysis by providing general results for Ricardian models in which industry e¢ ciencies follow a generic distribution, and not necessarily a Fréchet.
For this general family of models, we show that the welfare gains of the open economy with respect to the autarky economy can always be decomposed into two distinct sources: a selection and a reallocation e¤ect. The former is the e¤ect on average e¢ ciency of the selection of domestic industries that, thanks to their su¢ ciently low marginal costs of production relative to foreign industries, survive international competition. Such average e¢ ciency is computed by considering, for the sole industries that survive international competition, the same relative weights in domestic production as the autarky economy. The latter e¤ect, instead, is related to the rise in the weight in domestic production of the exporting industries, which is due to the reallocation of workers away from the less-e¢ cient non-exporting industries to the industries that start servicing the foreign market.
While the model provides very precise theoretical de…nitions for both e¤ects, their analytical expression is, in general, too cumbersome to be used for empirical purposes. In most applications, in fact, it would require computing several billions of distributions of e¢ ciencies. By contrast, this decomposition simpli…es dramatically if we impose that industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed -the assumption that makes our Ricardian model belong to the class of quantitative trade models. Under this assumption, we can derive exact model-based measures of these two e¤ects, which 6 can be quanti…ed using only data on trade ‡ows and domestic production.
The Fréchet assumption entails this simpli…cation for the following reasons. First, it allows us to easily quantify the gains from trade, as in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) . Second, it implies that the selection e¤ect is a measurable share of the overall gains from trade, making it possible to easily obtain the contribution to welfare of this e¤ect. Third, as a consequence, the reallocation e¤ect (whose quanti…cation is, in the general case, extremely di¢ cult) can be calculated simply as the complement of the selection e¤ect. Therefore, a key insight of our analysis is that quantitative trade models may be useful not only to assess the overall welfare gains, but also to properly measure their sources.
Using the Fréchet assumption, we also demonstrate that, when the gains from trade are small and there are still few exporters in the domestic economy, the largest share of the welfare gains is due to the selection e¤ect. As the export sector grows and the gains from trade increase, the importance of the reallocation e¤ect also rises.
Because the contribution of the reallocation e¤ect grows with the size of the overall gains from trade, it follows that the factors a¤ecting the former are exactly the same factors a¤ecting the latter. In particular, both the welfare gains and the contribution of the reallocation e¤ect are higher for small, open and very productive economies, located near to markets that are large, rich, and less productive and, therefore, easier to penetrate. Another interesting feature of our result is that the speci…c value of the trade elasticity, which is key to determine the overall welfare gains, does not a¤ect the shares of the gains pertaining to the selection and the reallocation e¤ect, making their measurement even more straightforward and robust than that of the welfare gains.
A quanti…cation for a sample of 46 advanced and developing economies in the years 2000 and 2005 shows that the selection e¤ect is, on average, somewhat more important than the reallocation e¤ect (accounting for about 60% of the gains from trade). In particular, the selection e¤ect is dominant for large countries: only in the United States and Japan, among the advanced economies, and in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, among the developing countries, does the share of gains pertaining to the selection e¤ect exceeds 80 percent. However, for small open economies such as Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, it is the reallocation e¤ect that is dominant, as it is responsible for over 70 percent of the gains.
These …ndings have important policy implications. Suppose that the export sector is less similar to other sectors of the economy in terms of, for example, skills that are 7 required to workers, as documented by the empirical literature. 2 This feature of the export sector could make the resource reallocation from other industries slower or more di¢ cult. In this case, our theoretical and empirical results suggest that, in the initial stages of trade liberalization (i.e. when trade barriers are still high), these frictions do not prevent to reap the bene…ts from trade, because most of the gains obtain from the selection e¤ect, that is from the closure of less e¢ cient industries and the reallocation of workers across all the surviving industries, which are mostly non-exporters. Similarly, large countries can expect to enjoy welfare gains almost in full, even in the hypothesis of a cumbersome reallocation to the export sector, thanks to the considerable size of their non-exporting industries. On the other hand, reallocation of workers to the export sector is crucial in small open economies. Therefore, to fully bene…t from trade, these countries must be ready to favor the resource reallocation to this sector, in particular by enhancing education and training for unskilled workers.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. Many recent empirical and theoretical studies have focused on one speci…c source of the welfare gains, that is aggregate productivity. An early example is Pavcnik (2002) , who estimates productivity improvements in Chile using …rm-level data. This study con…rms the importance of the mechanisms described in this paper, as it …nds that the exit of plants and the reshu-ing of resources from less e¢ cient to more e¢ cient producers are the main sources of the productivity gains. Many other papers, instead, have focused on model-based measures of the "productivity gains from trade," computed as increases in average e¢ ciency. 3 To better grasp the link between these papers and our own, it is worth recalling that, in the Ricardian model, the growth in world-wide aggregate productivity induced by international trade is the basic source of the welfare gains for all countries. In other words, countries bene…t from the fact that, by specializing in the production of the goods for which they have a comparative advantage, the world production of the optimal consumption bundle increases. Thus, our paper sheds light on how each individual country, through the mechanisms of selection and reallocation induced by trade liberalization, contributes to the improvement in world-wide aggregate productivity and reaps the bene…ts of international trade for its own welfare. 2 Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) show, in fact, that exporting …rms are more skill intensive than their domestic competitors. 3 See, for example, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) , Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012) , Bolatto (2013) , Sbracia (2013a and 2013b) , and Levchenko and Zhang (2015) .
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Another related strand of the literature is the wave of papers focusing on empirical estimates of the gains from trade, such as Feenstra (1994 and , Broda and Weinstein (2006) , Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2009) , and many others.
These papers use di¤erent econometric techniques to quantify either the contribution of speci…c sources of gains (usually those from consuming new varieties) or the size of the overall welfare gains. Our approach, instead, grounded on the derivation of modelbased measures of the welfare gains, follows more closely the one of Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Alvarez and Lucas (2007) , Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodríguez-Clare (2008) , Chor (2010) , Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) , and Ravikumar and Waugh (2015) . Unlike those papers, however, we are also able to quantify the contribution of the di¤erent sources of gains. 4 Our paper complements Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013a) , who focus on the average e¢ ciency of domestic industries (instead of welfare), which is a¤ected only by the selection e¤ect. In an open economy, welfare di¤ers from the average e¢ ciency of domestic industries, because it depends not only on the e¢ ciencies of domestic industries (which determine the price of domestically-produced goods), but also on the e¢ ciencies of foreign industries (which determine import prices). Thus, welfare and the average e¢ ciency of domestic industries are distinct concepts. In this paper we
show that the balanced-trade condition allows us to derive the import's contribution to welfare by using exports; this makes possible to compute such contribution starting from the e¢ ciency distribution of domestic industries. By using this technique, we can decompose the welfare gains into the selection and the reallocation e¤ect discussed above. As we show, the selection e¤ect turns out to be related to the average price of domestically-produced goods and the reallocation e¤ect to the average price of imported goods. Here, instead, we consider a general equilibrium model with perfect competition and, most importantly, we derive a quanti…able expression of the two sources that, in our Ricardian framework, provide the welfare gains. 5 It is worth noting that Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013a, pg. 100) also mention a "marketshare reallocation e¤ect" but, in that paper, that is the e¤ect of reallocation on labor productivity and not on welfare. Unlike their counterparts on welfare, the selection and the reallocation e¤ect on labor productivity are analytically indistinguishable and hard to quantify, even in the two-country case. On the contrary, the selection and the reallocation e¤ect on welfare are analytically distinct and easily
Given that a big chunk of the related literature focuses on welfare gains in monopolistic competition models à la Melitz (2003) , it is worth clarifying the di¤erences between these frameworks and the Ricardian one. On the production side, the adjustment that takes place after trade liberalization is very similar in the two frameworks.
In both models, in fact, domestic production: (i) focuses only on a subset of the goods that were made under autarky (these are the goods that are made more e¢ ciently with monopolistic competition, and those in which the country has a comparative advantage in Ricardo); (ii) becomes tilted towards exporters (who bene…t from foreign demand). On the consumption side, according to both models households consume less of those tradeable goods whose production remains domestic; however: (a) in the Ricardian model, households purchase more of the remaining tradeable goods (because imports are cheaper), so that overall consumption increases, even though they do not gain access to more varieties; (b) in the monopolistic competition model, households start consuming a greater variety of goods. For any country, if the trade elasticity implied by the two models were the same, then the gains from consuming a larger quantity of imported goods in the Ricardian model would be the same as the gains from consuming more imported varieties in frameworks à la Melitz (2003) . To put it di¤erently, if trade elasticities were identical, "Ricardo's intensive margin" would be equal to "Melitz's extensive margin". 6 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, which extends Eaton and Kortum (2002) to general distributions of industry e¢ ciencies. Section 3 shows that the welfare gains induced by international trade can be decomposed into two distinct e¤ects, related to the selection of industries and the reallocation of workers. Section 4 introduces the assumption of Fréchet-distributed industry e¢ ciencies, shows that the analytical expressions of the two e¤ects simplify, and quanti…es them for a sample of countries and years. Section 5 draws the main conclusions.
measurable. 6 We recall, however, the important caveat, established by Simonovska and Waugh (2014a) , that di¤erent trade models have di¤erent implications about the value of the trade elasticity. These authors, 
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The model
We consider a continuum of tradable goods, indexed by j 2 [0; +1), that can potentially be produced in any of the N countries of the world economy. Each good j can be produced in country i with an e¢ ciency z i (j) that, in turn, is de…ned as the amount of output that can be produced with one unit of input -where both output and input are measured in units of constant quality. Any country has a …xed labor endowment L i .
Inputs include labor as well as a bundle of intermediates goods, which comprises the full set of tradable goods j. 7 Technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, in which labor has a constant share 1 for all industries and countries; namely:
where q i (j) is the quantity of output j in country i, L i (j) is the number of workers, and I i (j) is the quantity of the bundle of intermediate goods.
Consumer preferences are the same across countries. The representative consumer in country i purchases individual goods in amounts c i (j) in order to maximize a CES utility function:
where > 0 is the elasticity of substitution. While the model allows us to deal with both inelastic ( 1) and elastic demand ( > 1), we will focus on the latter case, because the goods that we consider are all tradable and, in this setting, the typical calibration is > 1.
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Consumers maximize their utility function subject to a standard budget constraint. Because we assume that trade is balanced in the open economy, income avail-
International trade is constrained by barriers, which are modeled using the standard assumption of iceberg costs; i.e., delivering one unit of a good from country i to country n requires shipping d ni units, with d ni > 1 for i 6 = n and d ii = 1 for any i. By 7 We can ignore physical capital in the production function because the model is static and, then, intermediate inputs play a very similar role.
arbitrage, trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, so that d ni d nk d ki for any n, i and k.
Perfect competition implies that the price of one unit of good j produced by country n and delivered to country i is:
where c n = w n p 1 n is the cost of one unit of input in the source country n, with p n being the unit price of the optimal bundle of intermediate goods, which is the same as the unit price of the optimal bundle of …nal goods (see equation (3) below). In other words, we assume (as Eaton and Kortum, 2002 ) that producers combine intermediate goods using the same CES aggregator that consumers use to combine …nal goods.
Consumers purchase each good from the country that can supply it at the lowest price; therefore, the price of good j in country i is:
We assume that, in each country i, industry e¢ ciencies z i (j) are the realizations of a random variable Z i , with a country-speci…c cumulative distribution function
Because the z i (j) represent industry e¢ ciencies and there is a continuum of goods, it is natural to assume that Z i is non-negative and absolutely continuous for each country i. These are the only conditions that we impose, in this and in the following section, on the Z i 's (in Section 4, instead, we assume that the Z i are Fréchet distributed). As the expert reader may have noticed, we do not impose the standard restriction that the Z i are mutually independent across countries, but we allow for dependent (correlated) variables.
The continuum-of-goods assumption and the conventional application of the law of large numbers imply that the share of goods for which country i's e¢ ciency is below any real number z is the probability Pr (Z i < z) = F i (z). It is worth noting that, in the autarky economy, all goods are made at home and, then, Z i is the e¢ ciency distribution of the closed economy.
Given the cost of inputs, the distribution of industry e¢ ciencies translates into a distribution of good prices. More formally, let us denote with P i the random variable that describes the distribution of good prices in country i; this random variable is 12 de…ned as:
The price index in country i, p i , computed using the correct CES aggregator, is simply the moment of order 1 of the random variable P i , at the 1= (1 ) power; that is:
After a simple manipulation of equations (2) and (3), we obtain:
where
that leads to the real wage, which measures welfare:
The welfare gains from trade can be obtained by comparing the real wage of the open and the closed economy, where the latter can be obtained from the former, letting d in ! +1 for i 6 = n (using equations (4) and (5)). In this case, we have M i ! Z i and the real wage is E Z 1 i 1= ( 1) . Hence, the gain from trade for country i is:
Equation (6) shows that welfare gains arise from the transformation, that occurs in the open economy, of the "source of the production e¢ ciencies" (e¢ ciencies that, in turn, determine good prices) from Z i to M i . Note, in particular, that the latter random variable is a maximum between a set of random variables that includes also Z i .
Because the maximum of a set of random variables …rst-order stochastically dominates any variable included in the set, then M i Z i , so that g i 1.
10 In other words, the real wage is higher in the open economy. Thus, the result that trade is welfare improving is here proven using the language of probability, rather than the tools of general equilibrium.
11 9 Recall that, in the competitive equilibrium of both the open and the closed economy, welfare is
where L i is exogenous. 10 We remind the reader that the random variable X …rst-order stochastically dominates the random 11 The …nding that g i 1 for any i, proven using basic probability theory, generalizes a result of
13
Let us now focus on how labor units are reallocated after opening to trade. To foster intuition, we start by considering the case of two countries, say i and n, before generalizing the result to N countries.
A 2-country example
The …rst-order conditions (FOCs) of the consumer's problem imply that the demand for good j in country i is:
where U i = w i L i =p i is the level of utility achieved by country i.
The FOCs of the producer's problem, on the other hand, imply that the quantities of labor and intermediate goods used to produce good j in country i are chosen according to the following proportions:
By aggregating across industries both sides of equation (8), we …nd that the overall amount of intermediate goods used in country i is
The assumption that intermediate goods are combined using the same CES aggregator used to combine …nal goods implies that, for any country i, the demand for j as intermediate good, m i (j), is proportional to the demand as consumption good,
Hence, in any country i, the overall demand for good j is c i (j) = .
In the two-country model that we are examining, each good can either be produced abroad and imported at home; or be produced at home and sold only in the domestic market; or be produced at home and sold both in the domestic and the Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2013a) , extending it to a framework in which there are also intermediate goods.
14 foreign market. Therefore, the resource constraint for country i requires that:
for any j, where O i;z denotes the set of "zombie" industries of country i, i.e. those industries that shut down right after trade liberalization; 12 O i;d is the set of industries that sell their goods only on the domestic market; and O n i;e is the set of industries that sell both at home and in country n:
13 By construction, the sets O i;z , O i;d , and O n i;e form a partition of the set of tradable goods; hence, the intersection between any subset of them is empty and their union spans the whole set of tradable goods. The
i;e , on the other hand, includes the sole industries that survive international competition.
14 By plugging equations (1) and (7) into equation (9) (using also equation (8)), and solving the resource constraint for the number of workers in industry j, we obtain:
where:
The term k ni measures the rise in the weight of the exporting relative to non-exporting industries. It is related to the demand that comes from country n, since it depends positively on the size of this country in terms of relative GDP, and negatively on the iceberg cost between countries i and n, and their relative price levels. 12 We borrow the terminology "zombie industries" from Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) , who use it to refer to industries that are kept alive only by misdirected or subsidized bank lending. In the context of our model, instead, these industries would be kept alive by trade protectionist policies. 13 In the two-country model, these sets are de…ned as follows:
14 The term c n (j) d ni = in equation (9) represents the foreign demand that bene…ts only the exporting industries. In particular, the representative consumer of country n demands the quantity c n (j) = , but iceberg costs imply that d ni units must be shipped from country i to deliver one unit of good to country n. Thus, the overall quantity produced to serve the latter market is c n (j) d ni = .
In the autarky economy, O i;z = O n i;e = ? and the resource constraint returns, for any good j, L i (j) = z
(1 ) L i . Let us consider, then, how labor is reallocated after trade liberalization. With respect to the autarky economy, in the open economy the number of workers in the zombie industries goes to zero. The number of workers in the industries that produce goods that are sold only domestically declines (provided that > 1), because these industries face a tougher competition, due to the fact that imported goods are cheaper than those that were made at home under the autarky regime. 15 The number of workers in the exporting industries rises, absorbing all the workers "in excess" from the other domestic industries. More speci…cally, these industries sell less in the domestic market (as international competition brings in cheaper imported goods), so they would need less workers to serve this market, but foreign demand allows them not only to keep their workers, but also to hire new ones in order to produce more goods to be sold abroad. 16 Notice that, in any industry, the number of workers is proportional to the e¢ -ciency of this industry, at the 1 power (i.e. to z 1 i (j)). By aggregating across industries both sides of equation (10), we obtain:
from which we can derive the following decomposition of the real wage (which is proven in Appendix A for the general N -country case):
where i;o is the probability that an industry of country i survives international competition; i;e is the probability that it is also an exporter (with i;e i;o ); 18 Z i;o is the 15 If < 1 ( = 1), industries producing goods that are sold only at home would employ more (the same number of) workers. 16 For j 2 O n i;e , the two terms of equation (10) represent exactly these factors: the number of workers in the exporting industry that serve the domestic market (which declines after trade liberalization) and the number of workers hired to start servicing the foreign market. 17 
Recall that E (Z
The triangle inequality implies that if an industry is an exporter, then it must necessarily sell its goods also in its domestic market.
random variable that describes the e¢ ciencies of the surviving industries; and Z i;e;n describes the e¢ ciencies of the industries that export in country n.
Equation (12) shows -together with equation (10), from which it is derivedthe two sources of the welfare gains of this model. The …rst one comes from impact of the selection of industries due to international competition, that transforms the average e¢ ciency of the economy from E(Z
The second one comes from the reallocation of workers to the exporting industries, which provides a contribution to welfare that is separate and additional to the previous one (measured by the second term inside the square brackets on the right-hand side of (12)). 19 This contribution depends on the strength of foreign demand (as measured by k ni ) and is key to the result that trade is welfare improving. In fact, although the real wage always rises after trade openness, the average e¢ ciency does not necessarily rise. 20 Hence, economies in which average e¢ ciency is lower under trade openness, still bene…t from trade thanks to this additional reallocation e¤ect. Under broad conditions about the distribution of industry e¢ ciencies, however, also the selection e¤ect provides a positive contribution to welfare and, in the next section, we discuss and quantify both e¤ects for one speci…c model that ful…ls those conditions.
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To further foster the intuition on the sources of welfare identi…ed in equation (12), Appendix B shows that welfare depends on the average price of domesticallyproduced goods and the average price of imported goods. The selection e¤ect turns out to be related to the former average and the reallocation e¤ect to the latter. The average price of imported goods, in particular, depends on the e¢ ciency distribution of foreign exporters. However, by using the resource constraint, which is equivalent to the 19 The e¢ ciencies of the exporting industries are included also in Z i;o (that describes the e¢ ciency of all the surviving industries, including the exporters). Therefore, the contribution of the reallocation e¤ect is distinct from the one that comes from the selection e¤ect. 20 In other words, the result that M i Z i implies that E M balanced-trade condition, in equation (12) we are able to use the e¢ ciency distribution of domestic instead of foreign exporters (i.e., we use exports instead of imports) and then obtain a term that can be easily quanti…ed.
Before turning to the quanti…cation, however, let us show how the welfare decomposition (12) generalizes to the case of many countries (N 2).
The N -country case
For the general multi-country framework, in Appendix A we prove that the real wage in each country i has still two components, the selection e¤ect (SE i ) and the reallocation e¤ect (RE i ): 1) . (13) The …rst term inside the brackets of the right hand side of (13) has the same expression as the corresponding term of the two-country case:
The second term is now more cumbersome:
i;e;n k ni E Z 
where i;e;n;h;:::;k is the probability that an industry of country i exports in (and only) countries n, h, ..., and k; while Z i;e;n;h;:::;k is the distribution of the e¢ ciencies of these industries.
As shown by equations (12) and (15), in both the cases N = 2 and N > 2 the magnitude of the reallocation e¤ect is governed by k ni (equation (11)). In particular, k ni and the size of the reallocation e¤ect are larger if country i is relatively more productive (p i =p n is low), and if the destination market n is rich (w n =w i high), large (L n is high relative to L i ) and not too far away (d ni low). Thus, geography, which is key in the Ricardian model as shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002) , exerts its e¤ects mostly through the reallocation of workers to the export sector.
In principle, quantifying the expressions of (14) and (15) is not an impossible task, although it may be rather daunting. Given the joint distribution of (Z 1 ; :::; Z N ), in fact, one can always derive the distribution of any of the Z i;e;n;h;:::;k , which are just univariate conditional distributions (see Appendix A). However, in empirical applications their number might be extremely large, making their computation a very challenging task.
With N countries, one has to compute the distributions of the e¢ ciencies for the industries that export in each of the N 1 foreign countries, those for the industries that export in all the possible N (N 1) =2 couples of countries, etc.. For instance, in the 46-country application that we consider in the next section, one should have to compute a total of more than 35,000 billions of di¤erent distributions (that is 2 N 1 1).
In the next section, instead, we show that, by introducing an assumption that transform our general Ricardian model into one of the quantitative trade models of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) , the quanti…cation of the two e¤ects simpli…es dramatically.
Fréchet-distributed e¢ ciencies
We now assume that, in any country i, industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed, with parameters T i and ; 22 hence, the probability that an industry of country i has an e¢ ciency lower that a positive real number z is F i (z) = exp T i z . For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that these distributions are mutually independent across countries. 23 The moment of order k of Z i is:
which exists if and only if > k, where is Euler's Gamma function. Because welfare is related to the moment of order 1 of Z i , we assume > 1. The parameter T i , usually de…ned as the "state of technology" of country i, captures country i's absolute 22 Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2009) show that the Fréchet distribution emerges from a dynamic model of innovation in which, at each point in time: (i) the number of ideas that arrive about how to produce a good follows a Poisson distribution; (ii) the e¢ ciency conveyed by each idea is a random variable with a Pareto distribution; (iii) …rms produce goods using always the best idea that has arrived to them. 23 The key assumption is that industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed, while independence can easily be relaxed. In particular, Eaton and Kortum (2002) propose a multivariate Fréchet distribution for industry e¢ ciencies that allows for correlation across countries, and Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013a) use it to compute the "productivity gains from trade" for di¤erent degrees of correlation.
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advantage: an increase in T i relative to T n implies an increase in the share of goods that country i produces more e¢ ciently than country n. The shape parameter , common to all countries, is inversely related to the dispersion of Z i . It is related to the concept of comparative advantage because, in the Ricardian model, gains from trade depend on the heterogeneity in e¢ ciencies. In this model, a decrease in (i.e. higher heterogeneity), coupled with mutual independence, generates larger gains from trade for all countries.
An important property of the model with Fréchet-distributed e¢ ciencies is that the price distribution in country i for the goods imported from country n is the same for any n (and equal to P i ). Thus, for example, source countries with a higher state of technology or lower iceberg costs exploit these advantages by selling a wider range of goods to that country but, in the equilibrium, the price distributions of the goods that the various foreign sources supply to the destination market i are identical (see Kortum, 2002, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2012) . A related key property is that, in the open economy: M i = Z i;o . 24 Hence, equation (5) becomes:
We now show how the analytical decomposition of welfare simpli…es and how its sources can be quanti…ed under the Fréchet assumption. Combining equation (17) with (13) and using equation (14), it turns out that:
while it is still SE i = i;o E Z 1 i;o . 24 If the random variables X F r echet ( ; ) and Y F r echet ( ; ) are independent, then
This property is important to quantify the overall welfare gains and the welfare decomposition, because it enables to focus on the change of the distribution of industry e¢ ciencies induced by trade In the Fréchet case, instead, not only the identity assumption, but also the independence assumption can be relaxed. (We thank a referee for stimulating this discussion; a proof for these results is available from the authors upon request.)
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The welfare gain induced by trade openness (equation (6)) becomes: ( 1) , that, in turn, can be decomposed as:
1= ( 1) .
In other words, given the overall gain from trade g i , a share i;o of the gain is due to the selection e¤ect, while its complement, 1 i;o , is due to the reallocation e¤ect. 25 We can now turn to the measurement. The properties of the Fréchet distribution imply that Z i;o is still a Fréchet, with parameters i and , where:
It follows that:
To quantify g i , we borrow from Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013a, Proposition 5) the result that:
25 In interpreting the shares of the welfare gains due to the selection and the reallocation e¤ect, we can safely ignore the complication due to the exponent 1= ( 1). In fact, a monotone transformation of the utility function, such as the one that can be obtained by taking U i at the ( 1) power, would yield the same equilibrium quantities and relative prices. In this transformed model, then, welfare would be the same as in the original model, but at the ( 1) power, making the exponent of the gains from trade equal to 1 (while leaving the base unchanged). 26 The result follows immediately from the property described in footnote 22 and the fact that if X F r echet ( ; ) and a > 0, then aX F r echet a ; . 27 Note that i > T i . In other words, if industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed, then the average e¢ ciency of the surviving industries is always higher than that of the whole set of domestic industries (i.e. of the set that includes also the industries that shut down after trade liberalization). This feature of the "quantitative Ricardian trade model" is both consistent with the available empirical evidence and it is shared by a large class of Ricardian models (see footnote 20).
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in which IM P i is the value of country i's aggregate imports, P RO i is the value of its production, and EXP i is the value of aggregate exports. Thus:
This is the same result established by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) for the larger class of quantitative trade models. In fact, 1 i , which is equal to one minus the import penetration ratio, is the so-called "trade domestic share" (i.e. the share of expenditure on domestic goods), while in this Ricardian model the trade elasticity is .
The quanti…cation of the selection and the reallocation e¤ect can be completed once that we derive i;o , which is the probability that an industry of country i survives international competition. Using the properties of the Fréchet distribution, it is easy to …nd that:
Note that, because welfare gains are increasing in i , it follows that, when the gains are larger, the selection e¤ect is less important and the reallocation e¤ect is more important. This result can be readily explained. When the gains from trade are small, the selection e¤ect matters mostly because there are few exporters in the domestic economy and, then, the possibilities of reallocating workers in these industries are fewer. On the other hand, as the export sector grows and the gains from trade increase, the importance of the reallocation e¤ect also rises because exporting industries (which are on average more productive) absorb more workers.
What does the data show about the size of these two e¤ects? Table 1 (20), taking the value of the main parameters from literature. In particular, we assume that the shape parameter is = 4, as advocated by Simonovska and Waugh (2014b) , and the share of intermediate goods in production is = 0:33, a conventional measure of the share of value added in total output. The share of the gains from trade pertaining to the selection and reallocation e¤ects, respectively equal to i;o and 1 i;o , are computed using equation (21) .
Given that the Ricardian theory laid out in this paper best describes trade in manufactures, rather than in natural resources or primary goods, we follow the litera- ture and consider data on the values of domestic production, exports and importswhich is all is needed to compute the gains from trade as well as the contribution of their sources -all referred to the manufacturing sector. In addition, given that the model assumes that trade is balanced, in the application we impose that exports are identical to imports (equal to their average).
For each year, Table 1 As it is well known, the size of the gains is quite sensitive to the assumptions about the value of the shape parameter and the share of intermediate goods in production.
For instance, by taking = 6:66 instead of = 4 (as Alvarez and Lucas, 2007) , the gains would be about 60 percent of those reported in Table 1 Our results also show that the share of the welfare gains due the reallocation e¤ect is larger, the larger is the overall welfare gains. Thus, countries that can potentially gain more from trade -i.e. small open economies that are close to large, rich, and less e¢ cient markets -would gain mostly from the reallocation e¤ect. Therefore, to fully reap the bene…ts from international trade, they must be ready to favor the reallocation of resources towards exporting industries, for example supporting workers'education and training.
The key insight from our analysis, however, is that quantitative trade models seem to be useful not only in order to assess the overall welfare gains, but also to properly measure their sources -an issue that deserves to be further explored in future studies tackling other models in this class. The route taken in this paper of using quantitative trade models to measure not only the overall welfare gains from trade, but also the contribution of their sources, appears to be a promising area for theoretical and empirical research.
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Appendix A Welfare decomposition with many countries
In order to prove equation (13), let us start by generalizing the resource constraint (9) to a context with more than just two countries. As in the two-country case, we still have: Solving the resource constraint for the number of workers in industry j, we obtain:
(1 ) L i (1 + k ni + k hi + ::: + k ki ) if j 2 O n;h;:::;k i;e , (22) where the terms k li are de…ned as in equation (11), for any destination market l.
Note that the sets O i;z , O i;d , O n;h;:::;k i;e (for any fn; h; :::; kg as above) form a partition of the set of tradable goods. By aggregating across industries both sides of equation (22), we obtain the following: 
where i;d is the probability that an industry of country i survives international competition and serves only the domestic market (i.e. i;d = Pr(Z i 2 O i;d )); i;e;n;h;:::;k is the probability that an industry of country i exports in (and only) countries n, h, ..., and k (i.e. i;e;n;h;:::;k = Pr(Z i 2 O n;h;:::;k i;e )); Z i;e;n;h;:::;k is the distribution of the e¢ ciencies of these industries (i.e. Z i;e;n;h;:::;k = Z i jZ i 2 O n;h;:::;k i;e ). Considering that:
i;o E Z 1 i;o = i;d E Z 1 i;d + ::: + i;e;n;h;:::;k E Z 1 i;e;n;h;:::;k + ::: , 28 The analytical de…nition of O n;h;:::;k i;e is as follows: this set includes all the industries that export in countries n, h, ..., and k, i.e. those for which z i (j) =c i > z l (j) d li =c l , for l = n; h; :::; k; and excludes those that export in countries di¤erent from n, h, ..., and k, i.e. those for which z i (j) =c i < z l (j) d li =c l for l 6 = n; h; :::; k.
we can conveniently rearrange the right-hand side of equation (23) into the sum of two terms, given by equations (14) and (15) . By taking the 1= ( 1) power of both sides, we …nally obtain equation (13) .
B Welfare decomposition and average prices
Recal that, in the two-country example, the price of good j in country i is c i =z i (j)
if the good is domestically produced; it is c n d in =z n (j) if the good is imported (from country n). Then, we can write: 
Equation (24) shows two main facts. First, it shows that country i's welfare depends on the e¢ ciency distribution of domestic industries as well as on the e¢ ciency distribution of those foreign industries from which country i imports goods, i.e. the e¢ ciencies of foreign exporters. Second, by comparing it with equation (12), it shows that the selection e¤ect (which coincides with …rst term in the square bracket in (24) ) measures the welfare gains obtained from lower average domestic prices; on the other hand, the reallocation e¤ect, which is the complement of the selection e¤ect (just like the second term in the square bracket is the complement of the …rst term in (24) ), is equivalent to the welfare gains due to lower import prices.
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For what concerns the reallocation e¤ect, in particular, notice that in Section 3, by using the resource constraint (which is equivalent to the balanced-trade condition), we have been able to use the distribution of domestic exporters in the decomposition (12) , instead of the distribution of foreign exporters as in the alternative decomposition (24) . In other words, the resource constraint makes it possible to shift the focus from imports to exports, i.e. from the e¢ ciencies of foreign exporters to the e¢ ciencies of domestic exporters.
